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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a spacial model of ATM networks to explore the implications for banks and
non-banks of interchange fees, foreign fees and surcharges applied to transactions by customers at
other than an own-bank ATM. Surcharging raises the price (foreign fee plus surcharge) paid by
customers above the joint profit-maximizing level achieved by setting the interchange fee at
marginal cost and not surcharging. Similar size banks would agree not to surcharge, but such an
agreement is typically not possible between a bank and a non-bank. A high cost of teller transactions
modifies the tendency towards high ATM fees. 
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binding arbitration ruling. Plus and Cirrus subsequently faced the threat of a legal challenge to their
surcharging ban by ATM owners on anti-trust grounds. The networks were also under pressure from new
laws and regulations in 15 states that permitted surcharging. See Ruud and Webre (1998).
Fees and surcharging in automatic teller machine networks:
Non-bank ATM providers versus large banks
1. Introduction
The wide-spread introduction of surcharges on ATM (Automatic Teller Machine)
transactions in North America has become a high profile issue, creating concern among consumer
advocates and public policy makers about disclosure and fairness in ATM fees. Surcharges
proliferated after April 1996 when, in response to pressure from State governments and the courts,
both of the U.S. national ATM networks, Cirrus and Plus, lifted the prohibition they had maintained
on surcharging up to that point.
1 At the same time the networks agreed to allow the entry of non-
banks. Non-banks provide only ATM services, whereas banks typically both own ATMs and issue
cards so that customers can access ATMs. As we will show, network membership by non-banks has
significant implications in raising the fees that customers have to pay for ATM transactions.
  ATM networks were initially developed as a means by which banks could save costs by
shifting customers from costly “teller” transactions using personnel at a branch to the use of
machines. In the early 1980s in North America, these initially proprietary systems evolved into
shared networks, which enhanced consumer convenience in accessing their account, without having
to go to their branch. A main fee set by the (shared) network is an “interchange fee” that banks must
pay to other member firms for each transaction made by one of their customers at another member’s2
     2According to McAndrews (1998), the interchange fee ranges from $0.30 to $0.60 per transaction in the
U.S.. We abstract from other fees, such as a “switch fee”, ranging from $0.02 to $0.15, which is paid by
network members to cover the cost of routing transactions through the network. 
     3Hannan (2001) states that 72.3% of U.S. banks surveyed in 1999 charged foreign fees for withdrawals at
a non-own ATM, while only 6.4% charged their own customers fees for withdrawals from own ATMs. An
exception is the 1995, $3 charge set by First Chicago for some teller transactions (see Duclaux, 1995).
 
     4Transaction costs vary between $0.15 to $0.50 for an ATM and $1 to $2 for a teller (Fasig, 2001). 
ATM.
2 In order to recover at least part of the cost, banks typically charge their own customers a
“foreign fee” for these transactions. In addition to the foreign fee, customers making ATM
transactions at other than their own bank may pay a “surcharge” directly to the owner of the ATM.
This fee structure has the interesting and unusual feature that all three fees apply to the same
transaction. Even apart from effects on consumer welfare, this raises the question as to the differing
incentives of network members that drive these three fees.
This paper considers the profit implications of all three fees (interchange fees, foreign fees
and surcharges) in the context of a spatial model of ATM networks in which consumers move
around the “city” as represented by a circular network of ATMs. Consumers face a tradeoff between
the inconvenience of travelling to the closest ATM of their own bank and the total price, the sum of
the foreign fee and surcharge, that they must pay for a transaction at other ATMs. Consumers may
also choose to travel to the branch of their bank so as to use a teller. Banks charge an up-front fee
for a banking package that allows customers to make transactions at an own-bank ATM or an in-
branch teller at no additional cost.
3 A feature of the analysis is our consideration of the effects of the
higher marginal cost of teller transactions.
4 
  Firms providing ATM services differ based on their number of customers with banking
relationships. At the extremes, the network  members could be two banks with equal numbers of
customers or a large bank with all the customers together with a non-bank ATM provider. The paper3
    
5See the draft consent order issued by the Canadian Competition Tribunal (1996). 
contrasts these two polar cases so as to explain the conflict of interest in fee setting between a large
bank and a non-bank. Conflicts arise because asymmetry in the number of customers causes
asymmetry in the extent to which the ATMs of each member firm are shared. If two banks have
equal numbers of customers, then each bank has access to the revenues generated by the same
number of the other bank’s customers, whereas if one of the members is a non-bank, the non-bank
gains access to the bank’s customers, but there are no “other customers” from whom the bank can
collect fees. Such conflicts have relevance for whether large banks would want non-banks as network
members. For example, prior to the 1996 ruling by the Canadian Competition Tribunal, the Interac
network, which was controlled by large Canadian banks, specifically prohibited membership by non-
banks.
5 
Foreign fees and surcharges are determined at a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, whereas
the joint decision as to the level of the interchange fee is made a prior stage based on Nash
bargaining. The state of the law as to whether or not networks can ban surcharging affects the outside
option under Nash bargaining. We examine the implications of a move from a ban on surcharging
to the surcharging equilibrium and also the question as to the conditions under which members of
the network would make a voluntary agreement not to surcharge. 
In order to focus on the differing incentives of banks and non-banks towards the interchange
fee and surcharging as a network-wide decision, we simplify the analysis by assuming that firms
each deploy the same number of ATMs, which are positioned symmetrically around the circle and
interleaved so as to maximize customer convenience. Based on related but different models,
Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) and McAndrews (2001) both show that banks with a greater number4
     6Empirically, banks with larger shares of ATMs are more likely to surcharge (see Hannan et al. ,2003).
of ATMs tend to set higher surcharges.
6 We expect that if our model were extended to incorporate
differences in the number of ATMs across banks, similar results would apply. However, since non-
banks do not provide any customers from whom the banks can collect surcharges (or interchange
fees), customer base would continue to be the main driving force behind the differing preferences
of banks and non-banks towards interchange fees and surcharging at the network-wide level.
We first develop the implications of joint profit maximization for the shared ATM networks.
Comparing with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in fee setting then yields a striking result. If
surcharging is banned and if the interchange fee equals the marginal cost of an ATM transaction,
then the foreign fees set non-cooperatively by network members serve to maximize joint network
profits. By contrast, surcharging raises the total price (foreign fee plus surcharge) paid by consumers
above the joint profit- maximizing level. Interestingly, high consumer prices for ATM services are
ameliorated by the higher marginal cost of teller transactions. Banks lower their foreign fee so as to
shift customers away from the branch, with the result that total price is reduced at both the
surcharging or no-surcharging equilibriums.
Whether the member firms are both banks or a bank and a non-bank, we show that for a
given interchange fee, equilibrium levels of foreign fees and surcharges are unaffected. Thus the
conflict between banks and non-banks affects outcomes primarily through network-wide decisions
as to the interchange fee and surcharging. Not surprisingly, banks raise the foreign fee in response
to an increase in the interchange fee so as to offset some of the cost of the interchange fee payment.
However, if there is surcharging, then the foreign fee rises and the surcharge falls by an amount equal
to the increase in the interchange fee, with no net effect on the total price paid by consumers.5
     7These were Bank of America, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, Scotiabank and Westpac (see Demers, 2001). 
     8Since the 1996 Competition Tribunal ruling, which required Interac to accept non-banks as members, over
33% of the ATMs in Canada are “white-label” operated by non-banks with high surcharges (see Roseman,
2002). A similar story applies to the U.S.(see U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998).
Supposing surcharging is not allowed, an initially surprising result in the light of common
complaints that large banks charge higher fees, is that competition between a bank and a non-bank
or a larger bank and a smaller bank as measured by numbers of customers would lead the larger bank
to prefer a lower interchange fee. This follows because a bank with more customers makes a net
payment of interchange fees to a smaller bank or a non-bank. Correspondingly, the introduction of
surcharging leads to a greater gain in revenue for a smaller bank or a non bank, making the larger
bank more eager to prevent surcharging. It is noteworthy that whenever a ban on surcharging would
reduce the total price of ATM services, then such a ban would also benefit the larger bank. 
This suggests that if the law supports a ban on surcharging, then large banks will want to
enforce  this requirement. However, if network members have the option to surcharge, as is now the
case in most developed countries, an agreement between network members is required to prevent
surcharges. To achieve such an agreement, we find that banks must be sufficiently similar in size.
An example is the recent agreement by a group of large banks to exempt their customers from
surcharges while travelling abroad.
7 However, if a small and large bank agree not to surcharge, this
is likely to involve a higher interchange fee and hence a higher foreign fee charged customers than
would occur if no-surcharging could simply be imposed. Under most conditions, a non-bank would
choose not to be a party to such an agreement. These results suggest that the option to surcharge and
the entry of non-banks would lead to widespread surcharging. Recent experience in both the U.S.
and Canada supports this prediction
8. 6
     9Our case in which the network sets the interchange fee at marginal cost and bans surcharging, but members
set foreign fees non-cooperatively is related to ‘one-sided joint price setting’ as termed by Economides and
Salop (1992). However, in their setting, joint network profits are not necessarily maximized. 
The telecommunications industry has been a catalyst for the analysis of networks, from Katz
and Shapiro (1985) to more recent work by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998). Economides and Salop
(1992) explore the implications for market prices of the separate or joint sale of complementary
components of a good in a variety of settings, including ATM networks.
9 Matutes and Padilla (1994)
develop a spatial model to examine the incentives for banks to make ATM networks compatible
when deposit interest rates are used to compete for customers. There are three banks located around
a circle, each with one ATM. With the introduction of interchange fees and surcharges (called
withdrawal fees), they show that the equilibrium always involves compatible networks. The model
of McAndrews (2001) is most similar to ours in that general numbers of ATMs are symmetrically
positioned around the circle and three fees (foreign fees, surcharges and interchange fees) are
considered. However, the detailed structure of the model differs and the paper addresses different
issues, namely the effects of asymmetric numbers of ATMs and competition for customers. In a
model in which banks located around a circle invest in ATMs, Donze and Dubec (2003) show that
a high interchange fee set jointly by banks can act as a collusive device in raising the fixed fee that
customers pay for an account, but there are no foreign fees or surcharges. 
Of more direct relevance with respect to the questions we address is Massoud and Bernhardt
(2002) who develop a model in which two banks, located on a circle, provide both ATM and in-
branch banking services so as to compete for customers. Profit maximization leads banks to provide
ATM services at marginal cost for own customers, whereas other consumers pay a surcharge. One
of their main results is to show that laws requiring banks not to discriminate between own customers7
and customers of the other bank with respect to ATM fees would paradoxically raise ATM prices
above the surcharging level. This contrasts with our result that a ban on surcharging would reduce
ATM prices. This seeming difference in results can be explained by the fact that Massoud and
Bernhardt do not consider foreign fees or interchange fees. Prices fall in our model, because
consumers move from paying the sum of the foreign fee and surcharge to simply paying the foreign
fee. Prices rise in Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) because in order to gain revenues from the other
bank’s customers and not discriminate, banks increase the fee charged own customers for use of an
own bank ATM to equal the fee charged the other bank’s customers. 
The issue of self-regulation by ATM networks is also relevant. Self-regulation would give
networks the power to restrict members’ pricing policies, including the ability to ban surcharging.
A main argument for self-regulation, presented by Gilbert (1991) and supported by our analysis, is
that delegation of pricing to network members could lead to fees that exceed joint profit-maximizing
levels. An opposing argument in Salop (1990) is that self-regulation results in too few ATMs.
Indeed, the recent entry of non-banks in both the U.S. and Canada is in part due to the ability to
surcharge and has significantly increased the number of ATMs. This argument would suggest that
any loss of consumer welfare from surcharging is a short run effect, which would potentially be
offset by entry in the long run.
The spatial model of ATM networks is developed in Section 2. Section 3 examines the
implications of joint profit maximization and the equilibrium in foreign fees and surcharges is
developed in Section 4.  Section 5 explores the implications of the higher cost for in-branch teller
transactions. Section 6 then examines the conflict between network members in setting the
interchange fee and also develops the conditions under which the members of the network would
mutually agree not to surcharge. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.8
     10The high fixed cost of ATM installation, security and maintenance limits the numbers of ATMs.  Based
on estimation of a structural model, Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2003) argue that the introduction of
surcharging results in only a moderate increase in numbers of ATMs and welfare falls.
2. The model
2.1 The order of moves
Two firms i for i = A, B offer ATM services. Firm A is a bank and firm B may be a non-
bank. Banks also offer in-branch banking services through a teller. The ATM transactions are
assumed to be withdrawals. In addition to withdrawals, teller transactions allow customers to
undertake other banking business such as verifying accounts, exchanging foreign currency or buying
certificates of deposit. Consumers hold an account at only one bank i for which they pay a fee,
denoted F
i, where i = A, B if firm B is a bank. The banking package allows customers to make both
own-bank ATM and teller transactions at no cost. However, customers must pay the foreign fees and
surcharges applying to transactions at other than an own-bank ATM.
Investment in ATMs is assumed to take place prior to the setting of fees within the network.
To the extent that the installation of additional ATMs would raise profitability, a full model would
include this response in the long run.
10 However, since we assume general numbers of ATMs
(equally distributed across network members), our analysis already encompasses the effects of
different overall levels of investment. Also, taking into account the endogenous response of
consumers in switching from in-branch tellers to ATMs, we show that greater numbers of ATMs can
lead to higher prices for ATM services. Consequently, an expansion in numbers of ATMs may not
always solve the problem of excessively high prices.
  The model involves two stages of decision. In stage 1, the interchange fee is determined
through Nash bargaining by member firms. If there is an agreement not to surcharge, it is made at9
     11Whether banks actually set prices strategically is not obvious. For example, Prager (2001) suggests that
surcharges set by banks with large ATM networks are not effective in attracting customers from small banks.
this stage. Also, each bank sets F
i and consumers simultaneously choose their bank. In stage 2,
foreign fees and surcharges (if allowed) are set simultaneously, leading to a non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium. 
The choice of the interchange fee in stage 1 reflects the idea that network agreements are
harder to change than the transaction fees determined in stage 2. Also, in choosing their bank in stage
1, consumers see through to the fees set in stage 2, but banks do not set fees strategically so as to
attract customers.
11 The choice of bank prior to the setting of transaction fees can be justified on the
argument that it is costly to change banks (due, for example, to the use of pre-authorized deposits
and withdrawals) and that banks change foreign fees and surcharges more often than customers
change banks. Also, for the purpose of exploring the role of non-bank ATM providers, strategic
competition between banks for customers adds complication and is not the central issue. 
For our polar cases of two identical banks or a bank and a non-bank, the distribution of
customers is fully determined. Letting N
i for i = A, B, represent the number of customers of bank
i, if the network consists of two banks that set the same fees, then consumers choose each bank with
equal probability, which implies N
A = N
B. If firm B is a non-bank, then N
B = 0 and bank A has all
the customers. Almost all our results would apply if the analysis were restricted to just these two
cases. Nevertheless, it is useful to allow the share of customers to vary exogenously between these
two cases so as to consider the possibility that network members are a large and a small bank. There
are a number of plausible reasons why numbers of customers could differ across otherwise identical
banks. For example, one could imagine that the bank with the smaller customer base is a recent
entrant and since it is costly for consumers to change banks, differences in customer base persist over10
Figure 1.  Circular Market for ATM Services.  
a long period.
2.2 Spatial networks of ATMs
Each firm i for i = A, B maintains an ATM network, consisting of a general number M of
ATMs evenly spaced around the unit circle. As illustrated in Figure 1, the ATMs of A and B are
interleaved so that there are no segments in which two machines of the same firm are next to each
other. Since there is a total of 2M machines, the distance between adjacent A and B machines is R
/ 1/(2M). If each firm i has only one ATM, then R = ½. Each bank i issues ATM cards that allow
customers to make transactions at an ATM or at bank i’s branch, which is located at the centre of
the circle, equidistant from each point on the circle. For ease of notation, we assume that each
customer makes just one transaction per period and hence the number of customers serves as a proxy
for the number of transactions. Customers move around the circular market, but in such as way that
they are evenly distributed with the same probability of being at any particular location. This has the
useful implication that, although customer utility from ATM transactions varies based on location,
on average around the circle, customers can be treated as identical.11
     12Units are set so that a one unit increase in p
i has the same effect on utility as a one unit increase in d
i. 
     13If the utility from A’s or B’s ATM is equal, we assume a customer will choose an own-bank ATM.
 Customers of bank i have the option of travelling to the closest of bank i’s ATMs, which
involves a disutility, denoted d
i, equal to the distance travelled. They also have the option of
travelling the distance, R - d
i, to a “foreign” ATM of the other firm, but this convenience involves
paying the price, p
i, which consists of the sum of the foreign fee and any surcharge.  Letting x denote
the utility of an ATM transaction, each customer of bank i gains utility, u
H(d
i) = x - d
i, from use of
an own-bank ATM (supercript H for home) and utility, u
F(R-d
i) / x - (R- d
i) - p
i from the use of the
other ATM (superscript F for foreign).
12 Referring to Figure 1, a customer of B can travel d
B to B’s
ATM and gain u
H(d
B) = x - d
B, or travel R - d
B to A’s ATM and gain u
F(R-d
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between their own and the closest ATM of the other firm at a distance d
i =  from their own bank’s  d
i
ATM, where,
 = (R + p
i)/2  for  p
i 0 [- R, R]. (1)  d
i
Consequently, A’s customers will prefer A’s ATM for d




13 We assume p
i 0[- R, R]. Since  = R at p
i = R, the price, p
i = R is prohibitive in the sense that  d
A  d
i
customers only use the ATMs of their own bank, making the shared networks no different than two
separate unlinked ATM networks. At the other extreme, a subsidy of p
i = - R would imply no use of
own-bank ATMs. Since in practice, moral hazard problems would make transaction subsidies
undesirable, the possibility p
i < 0 is best interpreted as a price that is below (rather than above) the
zero price charged at an own-bank ATM.
For the proportion,  /R, of bank i’s customers located within   of i’s machine, the ATMs  d
i  d
i12
of the other bank offer no extra convenience. On average, these customers have to travel d
i =   / d
i 2
and hence their average utility if they use an ATM is given by u
H( ) = x -  . The remaining  / d
i 2  / d
i 2
proportion, (R -  )/R, of bank i’s customers prefer the other firms’s ATM, which implies an average  d
i
utility, u
F((R- )/2) = x - (R -  )/2 - p
i. Combining these two groups to take account of the  d
i  d
i
movement of customers around the circle, each customer of bank i gains an average utility from
ATM use, given by U
i / (/ R)(x -  ) + ((R-) / R)(x - (R-) / 2  -  p
i). Letting ((p
i) / (R - p
i)
2/2R and  d
i  / d
i 2  d
i  d
i




i) = x - R/2 + ((p
i)/2. (2)
At p
i = R, there is no sharing of ATMs and average customer utility from the ATM network is U(R)
= x - R/2. We assume that U(R) = x - R/2 > 0, which implies that U(p
i) > 0.
  The alternative to a withdrawal from an ATM around the circle is for customers to use a teller
at their branch (located at the centre of the circle). By using their branch for a withdrawal, customers
gain the benefit x, but they also gain utility or value, denoted v, from the ability to do other banking
business. We suppose that if a customer makes fewer visits to the branch, then this other banking
business accumulates so as to raise v. Letting D
O represent the probability of use of the branch, this
idea is captured by assuming that v is decreasing in D
O. A convenient functional form is 
v = (1-D
O)/$D
O for $ $ 0. (3)
It follows from (3) that v > 0 for all D
O < 1 and dv/dD
O < 0. For any given value of D
O, a higher value
of $ reduces the value of other banking business at the branch. 
Letting d
O represent the distance to the branch, each customer gains u
O from the use of a13
     14For simplicity, we assume that D
O is constant around the circle and hence depends on the average utility,
U(p
i), of customers using ATMs. Relaxing this assumption does not change the basic incentives that drive
pricing policies, but it significantly complicates the notation and analysis.
     15 The value of d
O could also be raised by assuming that a withdrawal at the branch (but not at an ATM)
involves a cost of waiting in line that is included in d
O. The branch may also be located in a distant suburb.
teller, where u
O / x - d
O + v. Setting u
O = U(p





O - R/2 + ((p
i)/2, (4)
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Thus, from (5), the proportion of transactions at an own bank ATM (rather than the branch) when
p
i = R makes access to the other bank’s ATMs prohibitively expensive is $v(R) = (1- D
O(R))/D
O(R). For
example, if $v(R)$ 1/2, then at least one third of these transactions are at an own-bank ATM. 
To ensure that D
O(R) < 1 so that there is some use of own-bank ATMs at p
i = R, we require that
$v(R) > 0 which implies v(R) = d
O - R/2 > 0. Thus if each bank has only one ATM (i.e. if R = 1/2), then
d
O > 1/4. To obtain d
O > 1/4, we suppose that d
O is equal to twice the radius of the unit circle (i.e.
d
O = 1/B = 0.3182 for B = 3.146) due to the need to travel both to the branch and back to the city.
15
We actually assume a slightly stronger condition, namely that 
v(R) - R = d
O - 3R/2 $ 0, (6)
which is used to achieve concavity of profit. Since d
O > 1/4, we obtain v(R) $ R if R # 1/6 due to the
bank having at least three ATM’s (i.e. M $ 3). The condition would hold for all M $ 1 if d
O $ 3/4.
Taking into account the probability of going to the branch, customers of bank i will use bank
i’s ATMs with probability D
H = ( /R)(1-D
O) and the other firms’s ATMs with probability D
F = [(R-  d
i
)/R](1- D
O). From (1), D
H and D
F can be expressed for p








i) = (R - p
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     16From (7), D
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F(R) = 0, D
H(R) = 1- D
O(R) and D
O(R) > 0, it follows that at p
i = R, customers use only their bank’s
ATMs and the branch. Correspondingly, since D
F(-R) = 1- D
O(R) and D
H(-R) = 0, a subsidy of p
i = - R
leads customers to only use the other firms’s ATMs and the branch.
From (5), an increase in the fee, p






i)/2R > 0. (8)
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3. Joint profit maximization
This section considers the implications for price of joint profit maximization in stage 2 taking
the account fees set in stage 1 as given. Letting c
O denote the marginal cost of a teller transaction and
c the marginal cost of an ATM transaction, the cost advantage from an ATM transaction is
represented by * / c
O - c $ 0. Using D
H = 1 - D
F - D
O, the average cost of ATM and branch





O + c. Each customer of bank i generates an




i) in foreign fees and surcharges, which, with account fees included,




i) - c + F
i. Taking F
i set
in stage 1 as fixed, the change in overall network profit per customer from an increase in p
i in stage











i) represents the effect on network revenue. The term, *D
ON(p
i), captures15
     17From (11), we obtain g(p






i)) $ 0 only if * + p
i > 0.








i) - v(R) = (/2 from (4) and (5) in (11), (12) follows.
the increase in cost due to the switching of customers from ATMs to the branch. The interchange
fee does not play a role since it is simply a transfer between firms in the network. 
 Since D
F(R) = 0 and g(R) = - *D
O(R) - c + F
i, the additional profit generated by each customer
of bank i from the sharing of ATMs is
g(p






i = R satisfy g(R) - g(R) = 0, it follows from (11) that R = 0 if * = 0. If * > 0, then we obtain
R < 0, which implies that the sharing of ATMs can be profitable even if consumers are subsidized
to use other than an own-bank ATM. However, since * + R > 0, the subsidy must be must be less than
the cost advantage *.
17 Assuming that R $ - R to ensure that p
i 0 [R, R] is within the range p
i 0 [-R, R],
* satisfies
18
- R # * # (v(R) + R)/D
O(R), (12)
where * = - 2Rv(R)/(R-R)D
O(R). As can be seen from (12), the upper bound on * is less restrictive when
the proportion, D
O(R), of customers using the branch at p
i = R is small. Since v(R) $ R from (6), we
obtain * # 2v(R)/D
O(R), which ensures that gO(p
i) < 0 for p
i 0 [R, R/2] (see (A7) in the Appendix). 





B) represents the joint profit (superscript  for
joint) from the ATM networks. Since g(p
i) does not depend on N
A or N
B, setting p
i 0 [R, R] to
maximize B
, it follows that the joint profit-maximizing price, denoted p
, is the same across network
members. Proposition 1sets out some properties of p
. All proofs of propositions are provided in
Appendix A.
PROPOSITION 1: (i)Joint network profits are maximized by charging a price, p
 0 (R, R/2), for use of16
     19Since v(0) = v(R) + R/4 (from (4)), we obtain p
 $ 0 iff * # v(0)/D
O(0) = (v(R) + R/4)(1+ $v(R) + R/4).
other than an own-bank ATM, where p
 $ 0 if and only if * # v(0)/D
O(0). If * = 0, then p
 > R/3. (ii)
dp
/d* < 0 and dp
/d$ > 0. Also, dp
/dR < 0 for p
# 0. 
From Proposition 1(i), joint profit maximization involves p
 < R/2. The gain in profit from
a higher price is limited by the ability of customers to shift to the branch or an own-bank ATM. The
sign of p
 depends on the magnitude of *. More specifically, p
 $ 0 if and only if * # v(0)/D
O. If there
were no cost advantage from ATM use (* = 0), then p
 > R/3. As set out in Proposition 1(ii), a higher
value of * reduces p
 . Conversely, a higher value of $ increases the use of ATMs, which raises p
.
For example, if $v(R) = 1/2, which implies that at p
i = R, one-third of transactions are carried out at
own-bank ATMs, then p
 $ 0 if and only if * # (v(R) + R/4)(3/2 + R/4).
19 If we also take into account
consumer welfare, then since dU
iL/dp
i + gN(p
i) = - (R - p
i)D
O(1 + $*D
O)2R < 0, maximization of welfare
requires p
i = R, which implies p
i = 0 at * = 0 and p
i < 0 if * > 0. Since M is taken as given, these
welfare results abstract from the costs of investing in ATMs.
Proposition 1(ii) also shows that dp
/dR < 0 for p
 # 0. This contrasts with the intuition that
an increase in the number, 2M, of ATMs, corresponding to a reduction in the distance, R = 1/2M,
between ATMs, should reduce the price of ATM services, which would imply that dp
/dR > 0. For
p
i > 0, a shorter distance increases p
i/R, making price more important relative to the distance needed
to travel to an own-bank ATM. Thus the proportion, D
F, of customers using other than their own
bank’s ATMs would be expected to fall, leading to a fall in price. This tendency is part of the story.
However, the greater convenience of ATMs as their numbers increase also causes customers to
switch away from in-branch tellers, which tends to increase D
F and, at the same time make D
F less17





2) > 0 and MD
F(p





is ambiguous in sign. From (8), (9) and 1 - 2$(D
O = 1 + $(v(R) - 3(/2), we obtain MD
FN(p
i)/MR = - D
FN(p
i)/R +
(1 + $(v(R) - 3(/2))(MD
O/MR) > 0 for p
i $ 0. 
responsive to an increase in price.
20 These latter effects tend to dominate for p
i/R small with the result
that greater numbers of ATMs have an ambiguous effect on price when p
J > 0, but p
J actually
increases if p
J # 0. Since the same opposing effects apply when foreign fees and surcharges are set
non-cooperatively, this suggests that an expansion in numbers of ATMs may not always solve the
problem of excessively high consumer prices for ATM services. 
4. Foreign fees and surcharges 
We consider three types of fees applying to the use of other than an own-bank ATM, namely
foreign fees, surcharges and the interchange fee. This section focusses on the stage 2 non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium in foreign fees and surcharges (if allowed). The interchange fee is set in stage 1.
The fees that an ATM provider can charge depend on whether it and the other ATM provider
are banks or non-banks. Since firm A is a bank, it can charge its own customers a foreign fee,
denoted f
A, for each transaction made at B’s ATMs. If firm B is a bank and surcharging is allowed,
then bank A will also impose a surcharge, denoted F
A, for each transaction by B’s customers at A’s
ATMs. Conversely, bank B will charge its own customers a foreign fee, f
B, for the use of A’s ATMs
and a surcharge, F
B, for transactions by A’s customers at B’s ATMs. If firm B is a non-bank, then
since bank A has all the banking customers,  bank A can set a foreign fee (but not a surcharge) and
firm B can impose a surcharge (but not a foreign fee) on transactions made by A’s customers at B’s
ATMs. In total, customers of bank A pay a price p
A = f
A + F




A respectively for a transaction at other than an own-bank ATM. Also, for the same18
     21Fixed costs of ATMs, such as financing and security, are excluded to reduce notation.
transaction, the network requires that the customer’s bank pay an interchange fee, denoted J, to the
other ATM provider so as to compensate for the service. 
The net revenue gained by bank A from transactions by its own customers at B’s ATMs is
given by the difference between its foreign fee, f
A, and J - c, which is the excess of the interchange
fee over and above the marginal cost of an ATM transaction. If N
B > 0, transactions by B’s customers




A + J - c)D
F(p
B) represent the average net revenue that bank A as an ATM owner earns from each
of B’s customers and using cD
H + c
OD
O = - cD
F + *D
O + c, bank A’s profits from the ATM network
including account fees, F













The corresponding expression for firm B is obtained by replacing superscript A with superscript B
and recognizing that N













If firm i is a bank (i.e. if N
i > 0), the first term of (14) represents firm i’s profit due the contribution
of its own customers to overall network profit less the net revenue, R
j / (F
j + J - c)D
F(p
i), that these
customers generate for firm j from the use of firm j’s ATMs. If firm j is a bank (i.e. if N
j > 0), then
bank i also receives net revenue R
j from the use of its ATMs by j’s customers.
Foreign fees and surcharges are determined at a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium where we
limit the magnitude of J - c by assuming that R # J - c # R and J $ 0. In setting its foreign fee, each
bank i chooses f
i to maximize B
i as in (14), taking the price, p
j = f
j + F
i for j … i paid by customers19
of the other bank as well as J and any surcharge, F
j, paid by own customers to the other bank as
given. Thus, letting f
i = f(J, F
j) represent the foreign fee where F
j = 0 if there is no surcharging, it
follows that at an internal equilibrium, f
i = f(J, F






j + J - c)D
FN(p
i)] = 0. (15)
From (15), the foreign fee, denoted f* / f(J,0) in the absence of surcharging, is independent of the
customer base and hence banks, whether large or small, charge the same fee for use of other than an
own-bank ATM. 
With respect to the choice of the surcharge, F
j for j … i, paid by bank i’s customers, firm j
(whether a bank or a non-bank) sets F
j to maximize own-profits taking the foreign fee, f
i set by bank
i and the interchange fee as given. If firm j is a bank, the fees F
i and f
j applying to its own banking










j + J - c)D
FN(p
i)] = 0. (16)
Letting F / F(J,f
F) denote the equilibrium surcharge and f
F/ f(J,F) the foreign fee, customers
pay a total of p
F / f
F + F for use of other than an own-bank ATM. Foreign fees and surcharges are
the same across banks, but the implications for profit depend importantly on differences in customer
base. Letting R* / (J - c)D
F(f*) and R
F / (F + J - c)D
F(p
F) denote the respective values of the net
revenue, R
i, received by firm i as an ATM owner at the no-surcharging and surcharging equilibriums,







i = R* at F
j = 0 and R
i = R
F at F
j = F. If R
i
> 0 and N
A - N
B > 0, the greater number of bank A’s customers leads to more use of B’s ATMs than
vice versa and hence to a gain, (N
A - N
B)R
i, by firm B and a loss, - (N
A - N
B)R
i, by bank A. 
A useful expression is m(J, F
j) / f(J,F
j) - (J- c), which represents the additional profit to
bank i from an own-customer transaction at an ATM of the other firm rather than at an own-bank
ATM. If m = 0, then since f
i - J = -c, the bank is indifferent as to whether its own customers use an20
own ATM at a cost c or an ATM of the other firm at net cost, f
i - J, after receipt of the foreign fee
and payment of the interchange fee. If F
j = 0, then m* / m(J,0) = f* - (J-c). Using (10), (15) can be










i)] = 0. (17)
As (17) shows, the foreign fee equates the increase in profit (i.e. M(mD
F(p
i))/Mf
i ) that bank i gains due
to own-customer use of the other bank’s ATMs with the increase in cost from the shifting of
customers to the branch. 
Now considering the no-surcharging equilibrium, Proposition 2(i) concerns the properties
of f* and m* and Proposition 2(ii) develops the comparative static effects of changes in the
interchange fee.
PROPOSITION 2:(i) If J - c = R, then f* = R. If J - c < R, then f* 0 (R, (R+J-c)/2) and
m* = f* - (J - c) = (R - (J-c))(v(f*) - *D
O(f*))/H(f*), (18)
where H(f*) / 2v(f*) - (* - ()D
O > 0. If J = c, then m* = f* = p
. (ii) fJ (J,F





i)+ ((1 + $v(p
i)D
O), then fJ < 1 and mJ (J,F
 j)= fJ - 1 < 0.
As shown in Proposition 2(i), if J - c < R, then f* is at an internal equilibrium with f* < R and
the sharing of ATMs, but if J - c = R, then f* = R. The case J = c is particularly interesting. Despite
differences in numbers of customers, if the interchange fee just compensates the ATM owner for the
marginal cost of ATM use (i.e. if J = c), then the foreign fee, f*, obtained non-cooperatively at the
Nash equilibrium is equal to p
 and hence serves to implement the joint profit-maximizing outcome.
Since gN(p
) = 0, it can be seen from (15) that f* < p
 for J - c < 0 and f* > p
 for J - c > 0. Also, from
(18), it follows that m* $ 0 and hence banks gain from their own customer use of the other firm’s
ATMs rather than own ATMs if and only if * # v(f*)/D
O(f*). If f* = 0, this is the same as the21
condition for p
 $ 0 (see Proposition 1(i)).
Proposition 2(ii) shows that f
i(J,F
j) is increasing in J, making f
i
J > 0 and hence f*J > 0 at F
j
= 0. Since banks pay the interchange fee when one of their customers uses another firm’s ATM, an
increase in J leads banks to increase the foreign fee charged own customers, so as to at least partially
offset the effect of this transfer on bank revenue. Since m* > 0 at * = 0, the possibility that the
foreign fee is too low to cover the net transfer, J - c, arises only if the additional cost, *, of a teller
transaction reduces f* sufficiently to make m* < 0. We are able to show that if * # Q(p
i)/D
O, which
is less restrictive than the condition * # v(p
i)/D
O required for m > 0, then f
i(J,F
j) increases by less
than the increase in J, making f*J < 1 and m*J = f*J - 1 < 0. Since p
 = m* = f* = 0 for J - c = 0, these
conditions imply f* > 0 and m* < 0 for J- c > 0 and p
 = 0. Consequently, m* tends to be negative
if J - c > 0 and p
 and f* are small. If p
 > 0 then m* = p
 > 0 at J - c = 0 and remains positive for 0
< J - c < R, provided p




F = m(J,F) = f
F - (J - c) at F
j = F, Proposition 3 sets out properties
of the surcharging equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION 3: (i) With surcharging, customers using other than an own-bank ATM pay the fees,
f
 F and F, resulting in a price, p
F = f
 F + F 0 (0, 2R/3), which strictly exceeds p
 . If p
F $ R/2, then m
F
> 0, whereas m
F < 0 if p
F # R/3. If * = 0, then p
F = 2m
F > R/2. If * = 0 and J = c, then m
F = f




F are independent of J: df
 F/dJ = 1, dF/dJ = -1 and dp
F/dJ = dB
 iF/dJ = 0.
As Proposition 3(i) shows, customers pay a surcharge, leading to an overall price that strictly
exceeds the joint profit-maximizing level. In raising its surcharge, each ATM provider ignores the
negative effect of a reduction in the sharing of ATMs on the profit of the card issuing bank leading
to a loss due to “double marginalization”. Since p
F 0 (0, 2R/3), it follows that p
F is positive even if22
* is sufficient large to make p
 < 0. If * = 0, then p
F = 2m
F > R/2, whereas p
 0 (R/3, R/2). If J = c and
* = 0, then m
F = f
F = F and p
F = 2f
F. If p
F $ R/2, then m
F > 0, but we obtain m
F < 0 if * is sufficiently
large to make p
F # R/3. 
From Proposition 3(ii), an increase in the interchange fee that banks must pay when own
customers use another firms ATMs is fully offset by an equal increase in the foreign fee that
customers pay for the service and an equal decrease in the surcharge charged by the ATM owner
with the outcome that p
F and profit, B
iF, are unchanged. Fundamentally, since J is a pure transfer
within the network, it has no direct effect on customer demand for ATM services and the two
instruments, f
F and F, fully offset the effect of this transfer on profits and the aggregate price, p
F, paid
by customers.
It is useful to recognize that F can be positive (a fee) or negative (a subsidy) depending on
the value of J. Letting J = J
F satisfy (16) at F = 0, then 
J




F) > 0. (19)
Since F is decreasing in J, it follows that F $ 0 if J # J
F and F < 0 if J > J




F. Also, since f*J > 0 (from Proposition 2) and dp
F/dJ = 0 (from Proposition 3), we obtain
f* # p
F if and only if J# J
F. (20)
At the surcharging equilibrium, m
F = f
F - (J - c) can be expressed as m
F = p
F - (F + J - c) and from




F). Thus if m
F > 0, a reduction in p
i below p
F would raise joint










) $ 0 (see (10)), joint network revenue is maximized at p
 if * = 0, and is increasing
in p
 if * > 0.23
5. ATM fees and the cost of teller transactions
This section further explores the effects of the additional cost * for in-branch teller
transactions, including the implications for the account fees, F
i, set in stage 1.
The requirement that consumers must receive at least non-negative utility to set up a bank
account, implies F
i # U(p
i), where from (2), UN(p
i) = (N(p
i)/2 < 0. Since consumers choose their
home bank simultaneously with the setting of F
i, each bank maximizes profit taking the number of
customers as given, with the outcome that F
i = U(p
i) where p
i = f* or p
i = p
F. Consequently, whether
bank A is a monopoly bank (N
B = 0) or there are two banks, banks are able to extract all the
consumer surplus from the ATM network.
We show in Proposition 4(i) below that in response to a higher value of *, banks reduce the
foreign fee charged own customers so as to put more emphasis on saving costs by shifting customers
away from the branch. Although ATM owners raise their surcharge in response to the decrease in
the foreign fee, the overall effect of an increase in * is to reduce the price, f* or p
F, paid by customers
for use of other than an own-bank ATM. Consequently, holding F
i fixed, the higher cost of service
by in-branch tellers is good for consumers. However, if F
i is allowed to vary, consumers are
indifferent. 
Interestingly, the higher costs due to a higher value of * are not necessarily bad for profits.
Letting B
i* represent firm i’s profit from the ATM network at p
i = f*, then Proposition 4(ii) shows
the expected result that for F
i fixed and J = c, an increase in * reduces B
i* for banks. However, if we
assume J - c > 0 making R* > 0, then the reduction in f* tends to reduce the distortion arising from
J > c and also redistributes profits towards smaller banks and non-banks by increasing the revenue
R* received by ATM owners from interchange fees. Consequently, if J > c, the profits of banks with
fewer customers are quite likely to rise and if firm B is a non-bank, its profits certainly rise. Similar24
     22We obtain A
A* > 0 for J 0 (R, R) essentially because A
A* = R* = 0 at f* = J = R and dA
A*/dJ < 0. 
results apply at the surcharging equilibrium, except that the fall in the foreign fee is partially offset
by a rise in F, which strengthens the gain of firm B at the expense of bank A. Moreover, taking into
account the increase in F
i due to the improvement in consumer utility as f* falls, we are not able to
rule out the possibility that banks are made better off even at J = c. 
PROPOSITION 4: (i) df*/d* < 0; df
 F/d* < 0, dF/d* > 0 and dp
F/d* < 0. (ii) If N
 i > 0 and F
 i fixed,
then dB
i*/d* < 0 at J = c. If N
 B = 0, then dB
 B*/d* > 0 for J - c > 0 and dB
BF/d* > 0. 
6. The interchange fee and agreements not to surcharge 
The fact that joint network profit is reduced by J > c or by the introduction of surcharging
raises the question as to the incentives underlying the choice of J and the conditions under which the
ATM providers will agree not to surcharge. This section explores the implications of the differing










ig(R) represent firm i’s
additional profit from the sharing of ATMs within the network, it follows that, with no-surcharging,
A
i* / A
i(J, 0) = N
i(g(f*) - g(R)) - (N
i - N
j)R*. (21)
For the sharing of ATMs, we require A
i* $ 0 for i = A,B. It can be shown that A
A* > 0 for N
A $ N
B,
but if R* < 0 due to J < c and N
A > N
B, it is possible that A
B* < 0.
22 We define J
B to satisfy A
B(J
B,
0) = 0. If firm B is a non-bank (N














FN(f*)fJJ) < 0 at N
A = N
B, which
holds if the first term dominates. It follows that d
2B
B*/(dJ)







+ (J - c)(D
FO(f*)(fJ*)
2 + D
FN(f*)fJJ)] < 0. 
Figure 2: Feasible interchange fees and relative firm size
From (21), and MB
i/Mf
i = 0 (see (15)), the effect of the interchange fee on profit at F









where dR*/dJ = D
F(f*) + (J - c)D
FN(f*)fJ. If the banks are the same size (i.e. if N
A = N
B), then both
banks would prefer J = c, which implements the joint profit-maximizing price, f* = p
. However,
since dR*/dJ > 0 at J = c, (22) shows that if N
A = N
B, bank A gains from a reduction in J below c
and firm B from an increase in J above c. Letting J
A* and J
B* represent the interchange fee preferred
by banks A and B respectively, this implies that J
A* # c and J





In Figure 2, the upper and lower limits on the value of J are shown by the dashed lines at J -26
     24If N
B = 0 or small, then bank A may prefer J = - 4, but values of J - c < R are not relevant for the analysis.
If N
B = 0, then since R* is maximized at some f* < R, we obtain J
B* - c < R.
     25From D
F(f*) + (J
F - c)D
FN(f*) = 0 (see (16)) and 1 - fJ(J
F, 0) > 0, we obtain dR*/dJ = - (J
F - c)D
FN(f*)(1 -
f*J) > 0 at J = J
F and hence J
R* > J
F. The result follows since R
F - R* = 0 at J = J
F and dR
F/dJ = 0.
c = R and J - c = R respectively. The solid lines from points A to J and J
R* to J respectively trace out
the value of these preferred fees as N
B/N
A is increased.
24 As shown in the Figure, J
A* is below c and
J
B* is above c, but J
A* rises and J
B* falls as the size of the banks become more equal. If the two
banks have the same customer base, then J
A* = J
B* = c, as shown at point J. As illustrated by the
solid line from c to L, the minimum value of J that is compatible with firm B participating in the
network declines from J
B = c at N
B = 0 to R as the banks become similar in size.
Suppose now that firms have the option of surcharging. From (14) and (21), we can express








F - R*), (23)
where, from (11) and (20), g(f*) - g(p




O(f*)) > 0 if c # J # J
F and g(f*) -
g(p
F) < 0 for J $ J
F. Evaluating (23) at J = J
F, since f* = f(J
F, 0) = p
F and R
F = R* at F = 0, it follows
that both A and B are indifferent between the no-surcharging and surcharging equilibriums.
Assuming * # Q(p
F)/D
O, which implies 1 - fJ(J
F, 0) > 0, we can show that R
F - R* > 0 if J < J
F and
R
F - R* < 0 if J
F < J # J
R*.
25 It can then be seen from (23) that the larger bank will strictly prefer no-
surcharging for c # J < J
F and surcharging for J
F < J # J
R*. By contrast, the smaller bank faces a
tradeoff between the higher joint profit (due to g(f*) - g(p
F) > 0 for c # J < J
F) under no-surcharging
and its gain from surcharging due to R
F - R* > 0 for J < J
F.
Whether there is surcharging and the value of the interchange fee in the event of no-
surcharging depends importantly on the rights of the parties under the law. We consider two legal27
frameworks. In the first, which was the historical reality in most states in the U.S. until 1996,
networks can prevent surcharging as a condition of membership. Within the context of our model,
enforcing such a requirement would be in the interests of the larger bank under the reasonable
assumption that it has sufficient bargaining power to make J < J
F, which includes the possibility that
joint profits are maximized at J = c. In the second legal framework, representing the current situation
in the United States and Canada, member banks can mutually agree not to surcharge, but otherwise
surcharging cannot be prevented. 
Assuming that the interchange fee is determined by generalized Nash bargaining between
members of the network, suppose first that there is a law banning surcharging. Each firm then faces
the outside option of not sharing its ATMs within the network. Hence if bank A has bargaining





". Now suppose that surcharging cannot be banned as a condition of membership. Since firms have
the outside option of surcharging, the value of J supposing that network members agree not to






1-". For the purposes of
Proposition 5 describing the results, we define J = J








F. As Figure 2 illustrates, J
Bb (shown as the dotted line HL) is below
J
B* (shown as the solid line HJ), which in turn is below the horizontal line representing J
F. 
PROPOSITION 5. (i) Whether or not surcharging is an option, if N
 A = N
 B, both banks agree not to
surcharge and set J = c. (ii) If surcharging is banned, then J 0 (max[J
 B, J
 A*], J
 B*). If N
 B = 0, then
J 0 (c,J
 B*). (iii) If surcharging is allowed and N
 B/N
 A > 1 - fJ (J
F,0), then Nash bargaining would
give rise to a no-surcharging agreement in which J 0 (J
Bb,J
B*) and J > J
 A*. If N
 B = 0 and 1 -
fJ(J
F,0) > 0, then no agreement is possible and surcharging is the outcome.28
It is easily understandable that identical banks would set J = c and agree not to surcharge (as
shown in Proposition 5(i)) since (from Proposition 2) such actions maximize joint profits. However,
this outcome is not guaranteed if banks differ in the size of their customer base or if a network
member is a non-bank.  Recalling that for the larger bank, J
A* < c and for the smaller bank, J
B* >
c, we show in Proposition 5(ii) that when surcharging is banned, the interchange fee can take values
between J = J
A* and J = J
B*, provided the constraint that J > J
B is met. In Figure 2 (assuming J $
0), the region of agreement is illustrated by the area BJDGc. Since for J < J
A*, both banks are better
off at J = J
A* and since for J > J
B*, both banks are better off at J = J
B*, Nash bargaining with " 0
(0, 1) implies J 0 (J
A*, J
B*). If firm B is a non-bank, the constraint J > J
B ensures J - c > 0.
However, it remains true that if the banks are not too different in size or if the larger bank has more
bargaining power, then, in cases where J - c > 0, one would expect that the amount by which J
exceeds c is small. In such a situation, foreign fees would be low, favouring bank customers. Since
it is the large banks that have pioneered the development of ATM networks, this case has particular
relevance for the United States up until the early 1990's when no-surcharging rules had not been
legally challenged. 
Now suppose that ATM networks do not prevent surcharging as a condition of membership,
but member firms can form voluntary agreements not to surcharge. Exploring the conditions required
for an  agreement, Proposition 5(iii) shows that N
B/N
A > 1- fJ(J
F,0) (corresponding in Figure 2 to
values of N
B/N
A to the right of point E), provides the dividing line at which the banks are sufficiently
similar in size for an agreement to be possible. If N
B/N
A is to the left of point E (which includes non-
banks), then dB
B*/dJ > 0 at J = J
F (satisfying B
B* - B
BF = 0 and F = 0), which implies that firm B
prefers surcharging for J < J
F and no surcharging for J
F < J # J
B*. Fundamentally, the higher
revenue from surcharging (R
F - R* > 0) for J < J
F dominates the advantage from higher joint profit29
for N
B sufficiently small. Since bank A prefers no surcharging only if J < J




A > 1- fJ(J
F,0), then dB
B*/dJ < 0 at J = J
F which implies that B’s preferred interchange
fee, J
B*, is below J
F and B
B* - B
BF > 0 at J = J
B*. Since B
B* - B
BF < 0 at J = J
B, it follows that B is
indifferent between surcharging and not surcharging (i.e. B
i* - B





B*. Consequently, any no-surcharging agreement must involve J > J
Bb as well as the
requirement (from both A and B) that J < J
F. The additional requirement from Nash bargaining that
J 0 (J
A*, J
B*) further refines the region of potential agreement to the (hatched) area HJS of Figure
2 in which J 0 (J
Bb,J
B*) and J $ J
 A* as described in Proposition 5(iii). As can be seen from Figure
2, HJS is an area of relatively high fees within the larger region, BJDGc of feasible fees when bank
B does not have the option of surcharging.
As a final case, it is interesting to consider the possibility that a network is restricted to
setting J - c = 0, leading to joint profit maximization (i.e. f* = p
) under no-surcharging. An
agreement to give up surcharging is then even more difficult to achieve since a smaller bank is better
off by not surcharging at J = c only if J
Bb < c. As illustrated in Figure 2, we have J
Bb < c if N
B/N
A is
at or to the right of point F.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper focuses on three fees (interchange fee, foreign fee, and surcharge) that apply to
the use of ATMs within a spatial model of linked networks. Foreign fees and surcharges are set by
banks at a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, whereas the interchange fee is determined at an earlier
stage, based on Nash bargaining. Banks also set a fee for an account at this earlier stage. An initial
but important result is to show that if surcharging is ruled out, then an interchange fee equal to the30
marginal cost of an ATM transaction will lead each bank individually to charge a foreign fee that
maximizes the joint profits of the shared networks. By contrast, surcharging always raises the total
price (the sum of the foreign fee and surcharge) of ATM services above the joint profit-maximizing
level. Whether or not there is surcharging, a higher marginal cost for an in-branch teller is shown to
reduce the total price charged consumers for transactions at other than own-bank ATMs.
Large banks and non-banks  (or small banks) face very different incentives towards both the
level of the interchange fee and the decision as to whether surcharging should be allowed in the
network. Since a bank with more customers makes net payments of interchange fees, it would prefer
a lower interchange fee than a small bank or a non-bank and also no surcharging. In competing with
non-banks, banks gain no customers from whom to collect surcharges or interchange fees. 
By changing the outside option available to the parties under Nash bargaining, the legal
framework with respect to surcharging can have a substantial impact on the level of fees. If no-
surcharging is established as a condition of network membership, then both firms face an outside
option of forgoing the gains from sharing their ATMs. However, if such a restriction is prohibited,
each firm can achieve at least their profit at the surcharging equilibrium. Since the option of
surcharging is more valuable to the smaller than the larger bank, consumers tend to lose from such
a shift in the law, both due to the increased prevalence of surcharging and the tendency for foreign
fees to rise if an agreement is reached not to surcharge. Generally, when surcharging is an option,
a greater similarity in size of customer base makes it more likely that the member banks will agree
not to surcharge and also keep fees low to the benefit of customers.
Relating these results to the Canadian experience prior to the 1996 ruling by the Canadian
Competition Tribunal, the fact that full membership and voting rights were restricted within Interac
to the large Canadian banks supports the idea that establishing and maintaining a shared network is31
easier if the customer bases of the network members are comparable in size. Also Interac’s
prohibition of surcharging together with its refusal to accept non-bank members (prior to 1996) fits
with the idea that large banks did not want ATM fees to rise. As shown here, surcharging would raise
prices above the joint profit-maximizing level. Also, banks had a motive to keep prices low so as to
save costs by reducing the use of in-branch tellers. The Competition Tribunal found that Interac’s
interchange fees were established collusively. For most goods and services collusive behaviour
would be expected to result in excessive prices, with incentives or coercion used to prevent
participants from undercutting. The Interac actions seem directly opposite to this expectation.
Consistent with our findings, the large charter members maintained downward pressure on fees
because of the network benefits they enjoyed. In particular, the $.75 interchange fee remained
unchanged for over 10 years, despite rising charges in other areas.
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PROPOSITION 5. (i) Whether or not surcharging is an option, if N
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B = 0. The results then follow as described in the text. G38
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